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Q1 2002
''This is a new article. As such is has been set to unassessed. Category:Content January 2002: FBI Aborts Investigation into Suspected Al-Qaeda Sleeper Cell in California In late December 1999, Rita Katz, working with the Investigative Project on Terrorism, gave a presentation in the White House to members of the National Security Council (NSC) about a suspected al-Qaeda sleeper cell based in Anaheim, California (see December 25, 1999). The NSC forwarded the information her team gleaned from public sources to the FBI. Katz later repeatedly asked a contact she had with the NSC named Peter what happened to the lead she gave them. Peter replied that he assumed the FBI was just sitting on the material. 2003, PP. 180 Around January 2002, Katz is contacted by an FBI agent in California who is looking for investigative leads on al-Qaeda in California. Katz forwards him all her information she gave in her White House presentation back in 1999. According to Katz, the agent looks over the material and says it is “very strong… I want to go all the way with this investigation.” Then the agent registers his investigation with the FBI so other agents with leads could contact him. A few days later, he calls Katz and says that he has been taken off the case because it falls into the jurisdiction of the FBI’s Anaheim office. Apparently that office does nothing with the lead. In 1999, Katz suggested the cell included Khalil Deek, arrested in late 1999 for involvement in a millennium bomb plot in Jordan (see December 11, 1999), his brother Tawfiq Deek, Hisham Diab, and Khalid Ashour. 2003, PP. 186-187 ABC News will later report that Diab continued to live in Anaheim until June 2001, when he apparently moved to Afghanistan to stay with top al-Qaeda leaders. NEWS, 12/23/2004 Khalil Deek is mysteriously released in Jordan around the same time (see May 2001); it will later be alleged that he was a mole for the Jordanian government (see Shortly After December 11, 1999). By late 1999, Ashour had requested asylum in the US. Katz will later note that he “could have been easily located, investigated, and if necessary, denied asylum and deported.” But as of 2003, Katz claims Ashour still lives in the US. 2003, PP. 187 Tawfiq Deek apparently continues to live in Anaheim as well, where he works for the state’s Department of Toxic Substance Control as a chemical engineer. He denies all terrorism ties, though he confirms that he was an active member of the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), which the FBI has called a Hamas front group. WEEKLY, 9/15/2005 Another associate of the above group, Adam Gadahn, will emerge in Afghanistan in 2004 as a prominent al-Qaeda spokesman (see Spring 2004). Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Adam Gadahn, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hisham Diab, Rita Katz, Khalil Deek, Khalid Ashour, Tawfiq Deek Category Tags: Khalil Deek, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Internal US Security After 9/11 January 2002: Mysterious Al-Qaeda Leader Sharqawi Captured in Pakistan Al-Qaeda leader Abdul Rahim al-Sharqawi, a.k.a. Riyadh the Facilitator, is captured in Karachi, Pakistan. US News and World Report will later comment that he is “responsible for managing al-Qaeda’s affairs in Pakistan,” but “little is known about the man,” since “US officials have released virtually no information” about him. One intelligence source says he is a field commander and a “serious logistician.” He is captured after a tip from neighbors who saw strange foreigners coming and going from his home. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 6/2/2003 The New York Times will later identify him as one of the four most important al-Qaeda leaders captured in the first year after 9/11. YORK TIMES, 9/10/2002 In late 2005, ABC News will report that he is being held in a secret CIA prison with about ten of the most important al-Qaeda leaders who have been captured (see November 2005), but nothing else will be known by March 2008. Entity Tags: Abdul Rahim al-Sharqawi Category Tags: Key Captures and Deaths, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11 January 2002: Rove: Republicans Can Win Elections on Issue of Winning War against Terror White House political guru Karl Rove tells the Republican National Committee: “We can go to the American people on this issue of winning the war terrorism. We can go to the country on this issue because they trust the Republican Party to do a better job of protecting and strengthening America’s military might and thereby protecting America.” In 2008, current deputy White House press secretary Scott McClellan will write: “Rove was the first administration official to publicly make the case for winning the war as a partisan issue, a marked shift in tone from President Bush’s repeated emphasis on unity and bipartisanship in confronting and defeating radical Islam.… Rove’s candor about this strategy infuriated suspicious Democrats, who condemned Rove for trying to politicize the war.” Bush will soon begin campaigning for Republicans in the midterm elections using Rove’s strategy. McClellan will note: “As governor Texas, he’d maintained good relations with friendly legislators by refusing to campaign against them, even if they were members of the opposing party. Bush’s actions prompted concern and anxiety among Democrats.” 2008, PP. 112-113 Entity Tags: Scott McClellan, Bush administration, George W. Bush, Karl Rove, Republican National Committee Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda Category Tags: Other Post-9/11 Events January 2002: Central Asian Countries See US Military Bases Expand Reportedly, the US is improving bases in “13 locations in nine countries in the Central Asian region.” SCIENCE MONITOR, 1/17/2002 US military personnel strength in bases surrounding Afghanistan has increased to 60,000. ANGELES TIMES, 1/6/2002 “Of the five ex-Soviet states of Central Asia, Turkmenistan alone is resisting pressure to allow the deployment of US or other Western forces on its soil…” 1/10/2002 On January 9, the speaker of the Russian parliament states, “Russia would not approve of the appearance of permanent US bases in Central Asia,” but Russia seems helpless to stop what a Russian newspaper calls “the inexorable growth” of the US military presence in Central Asia. 1/10/2002 Commenting on the bases, one columnist writes in the Guardian: “The task of the encircling US bases now shooting up on Afghanistan’s periphery is only partly to contain the threat of political regression or Taliban resurgence in Kabul. Their bigger, longer-term role is to project US power and US interests into countries previously beyond its reach.… The potential benefits for the US are enormous: growing military hegemony in one of the few parts of the world not already under Washington’s sway, expanded strategic influence at Russia and China’s expense, pivotal political clout and—grail of holy grails—access to the fabulous, non-OPEC oil and gas wealth of central Asia.” 1/16/2002 Entity Tags: Turkmenistan, United States, Taliban, Russia, China Category Tags: US Dominance January 2002: Giuliani Partners Opens for Business; Earns over $100 Million in Next Five Years Soon after leaving his office of mayor of New York City, Rudolph Giuliani opens a consulting company, Giuliani Partners, specializing in security issues. According to a 2007 report, it will earn more than $100 million over the next five years, making Giuliani a wealthy man. Giuliani selects several long-time associates as business partners, including Michael D. Hess, a former corporation counsel for the city of New York and now the senior managing partner of the firm. (Hess was rescued from WTC7 before its collapse.) Giuliani also hires his former police commissioner, Bernard Kerik, despite warnings that Kerik has ties to organized crime figures. Kerik will later be convicted of tax fraud. Some of the firm’s clients will prove controversial. Seisint Inc., a data-mining software company, was advised by Giuliani Partners on how to do business with the federal and state governments. In 2003, press reports will reveal that Seisint’s founder, Hank Asher, is a confessed cocaine smuggler and that Giuliani had touted the company in public speeches without disclosing his financial relationship with Asher. Giuliani also joins a Texas law firm named Blackwell & Patterson, which is then renamed Blackwell & Giuliani. Blackwell is involved in the litigation surrounding both the 2000 and 2004 elections, which were marred by allegations of voting irregularities and fraud. Giuliani’s business deals will prove to be a source of controversy and criticism during his 2007-08 presidential bid. POST, 5/13/2007; VANITY FAIR, 1/1/2008 Entity Tags: Michael Hess, Seisint Inc., Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani, Hank Asher, Bernard Kerik, Giuliani Partners Category Tags: Other Post-9/11 Events January-2002-December 2002: Prosecutors Not Allowed to Indict Al-Marabh In November 2001, US police called Nabil al-Marabh one of their top five suspects in the 9/11 attacks. SUN, 11/23/2001 In mid-January 2002, Canadian police call him “the real thing.” SUN, 11/23/2001 In late January 2002, it is reported that in Chicago, “Federal agents say criminal charges spelling out his role 9/11 and other plots are likely within a few weeks.” NEWS 7 (CHICAGO), 1/31/2002 Yet, shortly after this, there seems to be a dramatic change of opinion at Justice Department headquarters about al-Marabh. US Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald in Chicago drafts an indictment against Nabil al-Marabh, charging him with multiple counts of making false statements in his interviews with FBI agents. Fitzgerald already has several successful al-Qaeda prosecutions. However, the indictments are rejected by Justice Department headquarters in the name of protecting intelligence. In December 2002, Fitzgerald tracks down a Jordanian informant who had spent time with al-Marabh in a federal detention cell earlier in the year because of minor immigration problems. Fitzgerald has the man flown to Chicago and oversees his debriefing. The man reveals numerous criminal acts that al-Marabh confessed to him in prison, and the information fits with what is already known of al-Marabh’s history (see December 2002). However, Fitzgerald is still not allowed to indict al-Marabh. Another prosecutor in Detroit, trying some associates of al-Marabh in an ultimately unsuccessful case there, also expresses a desire to indict al-Marabh, but is not allowed to do so (see Early 2003). PRESS, 6/3/2004 Al-Marabh will ultimately be deported to Syria after serving a short sentence on minor charges (see January 2004). Entity Tags: Nabil al-Marabh, US Department of Justice, Patrick Fitzgerald Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Nabil Al-Marabh 2002-Early 2003: Wolfowitz Still Pushing Unlikely Theory Linking WTC Bombing to Iraqi Government Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz proposes that President Bush should declare Ramzi Yousef an “enemy combatant.” Yousef is already in the “Supermax” prison, the most secure prison in the US, after being sentenced to life in prison for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing years before. But Wolfowitz contends that as an enemy combatant, heavy interrogation could get Yousef to admit he bombed the WTC on behalf of the Iraqi government. However, Wolfowitz’s proposal is strongly opposed by the FBI, which asserts that theories tying Yousef to the Iraqi government had been repeatedly investigated and debunked. Further, Yousef doesn’t meet any of the criteria the White House had laid out for designating enemy combatants. “At one point, the high-level discussions apparently prompted a top Bureau of Prisons official to make an unauthorized entry to Yousef’s cell to sound out his willingness to talk—a move that prompted strong protests to the Justice Department from the bomber’s lawyer…” The issue is debated until the start of the Iraq war, at which point apparently Wolfowitz loses interest. One lawyer involved in the discussions will later recall, “We talked it to death.” 4/21/2004 Entity Tags: White House, Paul Wolfowitz, Ramzi Yousef Category Tags: Ramzi Yousef, Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links 2002-Early 2003: CIA Sets Up Secret Bases in Pakistan to Hunt for Bin Laden, but Foiled by Pakistani Escorts The US had been frustrated in their efforts to cross the Pakistan border to search for al-Qaeda figures (see Early 2002 and After). However, the CIA is now permitted to establish a number of covert bases inside Pakistan to help in the hunt for bin Laden. But the ISI and Pakistani military place strict limits on the mobility of CIA officers in Pakistan. They have to travel in the tribal border regions where bin Laden is believed to reside with Pakistani security escorts, “making it virtually impossible for the Americans to conduct effective intelligence-gathering operations among the local tribes on Pakistan’s northwest frontier.” In 2006, author James Risen will claim this arrangement begins in late 2003. 2006, PP. 181 But in a 2008 New York Times article that quotes high-ranking US figures, it seems the arrangement begins at some point in 2002 and ends in early 2003. According to this article, a small number of US special forces are allowed to accompany the Pakistani army on raids. But the arrangement does not work. Having to move with army greatly limits what the special forces and do and where it can go. Pakistani officials publicly deny that Americans are there, but locals see the Americans and protest, causing an increasingly awkward situation for Pakistan. Deputy Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage will later say he supported the Bush administration’s decision to cancel the arrangement. “We were pushing Pakistani government almost to the breaking point.” YORK TIMES, 6/30/2008 Entity Tags: United States Special Forces, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan, Richard Armitage, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Afghanistan January-April 2002: FBI Gives Control of Al-Qaeda Prisoners to CIA; Bush Rejects Law Enforcement Approach In the first months after 9/11, the FBI is generally in charge of captured al-Qaeda detainees and the assumption is that these detainees will be sent to the US for criminal prosecutions. However, beginning in January 2002, this policy begins to change. The highest ranking al-Qaeda detainee in US custody at the time, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, is transfered from FBI to CIA custody and then flown to Egypt to be tortured by the Egyptian government (see January 2002 and After). ]]). Also in January, the CIA, not the FBI, begins secretly flying detainees to the US-controlled prison in Guantanamo, Cuba (see January 14, 2002-2005). Journalist James Risen will later comment, “By choosing the CIA over the FBI, President Bush was rejecting the law enforcement approach to fighting terrorism that had been favored during the Clinton era. Bush had decided that al-Qaeda was a national security threat, not a law enforcement problem, and he did not want al-Qaeda operatives brought back to face trial in the United States, where they would come under the strict rules of the American legal system.” 2006, PP. 28 This change of policy culminates in the arrest of Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002). The Washington Post will later report, “In March 2002, Abu Zubaida was captured, and the interrogation debate between the CIA and FBI began anew. This time, when FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III decided to withhold FBI involvement, it was a signal that the tug of war was over. ‘Once the CIA was given the green light… they had the lead role,’ said a senior FBI counterterrorism official.” POST, 6/27/2004 The CIA decides that Guantanamo is too public and involves too many US agencies to hold important al-Qaeda detainees. By the time Zubaida is captured the CIA has already set up a secret prison in Thailand, and Zubaida is flown there just days after his capture (see March 2002). Risen will comment, “The CIA wanted secret locations where it could have complete control over the interrogations and debriefings, free from the prying eyes of the international media, free from monitoring by human rights groups, and most important, far from the jurisdiction of the American legal system.” 2006, PP. 29-30 Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Abu Zubaida, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert S. Mueller III, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: High Value Detainees, Destruction of CIA Tapes, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics 2002-March 2003: CIA Analysts Know that Iraq Has no WMD nor Ties to Al-Qaeda; CIA ‘Serving the Agenda’ of Bush Administration An unnamed CIA case officer with the agency’s Directorate of Operations (DO) later says: “I was working from the headquarters end in our Iraqi operations. In talking to the specialists, people who had worked on Iraqi issues or Iraq WMD for years, they said to me, ‘I always knew we didn’t have anything.’ This was before the war. But I mean, it was sort of horrific to me.… I talked to analysts and I talked to WMD experts, and I said, ‘Okay, is there a link between al-Qaeda and Iraq?’ ‘No, there’s not a link.’ ‘Do we have evidence of all this WMD we’re talking about?’ ‘No, we don’t have it.’ And then it was like a snowball, and all of a sudden we were at war. Everybody that I was talking to who did know about the issues were saying we didn’t have anything. And of course nobody’s speaking up. Who can they speak up to? There’s no forum for someone who’s involved in operations to talk to anyone and say, ‘We don’t have any Iraqi assets, we don’t have information on WMD, we don’t have anything there.’ But yet we all kind of knew it.… I understand that it CIA serves the President and the administration, but my thought is that it should serve the President and the administration in providing intelligence. And what has happened is that it serves the agenda—or at least for the Bush administration it’s serving the agenda of this administration, which is not what the CIA is supposed to do.” 2004, PP. 336-337 Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links Jan Feb February 2002: US Criticism Results in Iran Expelling Al-Qaeda-Linked Warlord to Afghanistan Flynt Leverett. Publicity photo In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Iran is supportive of US efforts to defeat the Taliban, since the Taliban and Iran have opposed each other. In 2006, Flynt Leverett, the senior director for Middle East affairs on the National Security Council in 2002 and 2003, will recall this cooperation between Iran and the US in a heavily censored New York Times editorial. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a notorious Afghan warlord with close ties to bin Laden (see 1984), had been living in Iran since the Taliban came to power in the 1990s. Leverett claims that in December 2001 Iran agrees to prevent Hekmatyar from returning to Afghanistan to help lead resistance to US-allied forces there, as long as the Bush administration does not criticize Iran for harboring terrorists. “But, in his January 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush did just that in labeling Iran part of the ‘axis of evil’ (see January 29, 2002). Unsurprisingly, Mr. Hekmatyar managed to leave Iran in short order after the speech.” YORK TIMES, 12/22/2006 Hekmatyar apparently returns to Afghanistan around February 2002. He will go on to become one of the main leaders of the armed resistance to the US-supported Afghan government. Iranian cooperation with the US over Afghanistan will continue in a more limited manner, with Iran deporting hundreds of suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives who had fled Afghanistan, while apparently keeping others. But the US will end this cooperation in 2003. 2/14/2002; USA TODAY, 5/21/2003; NEW YORK TIMES, 12/22/2006 Entity Tags: Iran, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Bush administration, Flynt Leverett Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran, War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Afghanistan February 2002: US Military Determined to Avoid Counter-Narcotics Operations in Afghanistan According to one former National Security Council official, Undersecretary of Defense Doug Feith argues in a White House meeting that since counter-narcotics is not part of the war on terrorism, the Pentagon doesn’t want to get involved in it. The former official complains, “We couldn’t get US military to do counter-narcotics in Afghanistan.” Author James Risen comments, “American troops were there to fight terrorists, not suppress the poppy crop, and Pentagon officials didn’t see a connection between the two. The Pentagon feared that counter-narcotics operations would force the military to turn on the very same warlords who were aiding the United States against the Taliban, and that would lead to another round of violent attacks on American troops.” 2006, PP. 154 Immediately after 9/11, the US had decided not to bomb drug-related targets in Afghanistan and continued not to do so (see Shortly After September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Douglas Feith Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Drugs, Afghanistan February 2002: Remote Drone Targeting Bin Laden Kills Three Innocent Civilians Instead US Central Command watches as a Predator drone captures images of a very tall man being greeted by a small group of people. It is quickly agreed the tall man could be Osama bin Laden, who is known to be tall. Within minutes, approval is given to launch a Hellfire missile from the Predator. By this time, the tall man has broken off from the group with two others. The missile hones in on him and kills him and his two companions. Journalists later report that the men were villagers who had been scavenging in the woods for scrap metal. YORKER, 12/16/2002 Entity Tags: US Central Command, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Afghanistan, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region February 2002: Transportation Security Administration Takes Over Airport Security, but Is Heavily Criticized The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), created in late 2001 in the wake of 9/11, takes over passenger screening duties at US airports from private contractors. This step will come in for some criticism; for example journalists Joe and Susan Trento will write: “The $700 million annual business was replaced by a $6 billion budget in a new federal agency. Instead of twenty thousand low-paid private screeners, the country ended up with fifty-five thousand well-compensated government screeners.” They will also point out: “The law that President Bush signed included a provision that only American citizens would be allowed to work for the TSA. This meant that even legal green-card holders waiting for citizenship could not be hired. Thousands and thousands of competent and experienced screeners who had protected airline passengers over several decades were told they were no longer trusted.” Ed Soliday, former head of security at United Airliners, will comment, “The congressional nationalization of security at our nation’s airports turned out as everyone who had experience in providing security predicted—very expensive and ineffective.” Former head of security at the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) Cathal Flynn will say: “Firing those Indians, South Americans, others who were doing good jobs was wrong.… When you think about it, the illogic of it is fierce.” Another security expert will say, “Thirty-five thousand people lost their jobs for no reason whatsoever other than the majority of them were minorities and foreigners and did not look and speak the way Americans would typically like, which would be a white male West Point cadet standing at every screen.” AND TRENTO, 2006, PP. 165-6 A 2004 review will find that the new, better-paid screeners are worse than the old ones who are fired at this time (see Spring 2004). Entity Tags: Joseph Trento, Ed Soliday, Susan Trento, Transportation Security Administration, Cathal Flynn Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Internal US Security After 9/11 February 2002: Powell’s Proposal to Secure All of Afghanistan Is Rejected by Rumsfeld Secretary of State Colin Powell argues in a White House meeting that US troops should join the small international peacekeeping force patrolling Kabul, Afghanistan, and help Hamid Karzai extend his influence beyond just the capital of Kabul. The State Department has held initial talks with European officials indicating that a force of 20,000 to 40,000 peacekeepers could be created, half from Europe and half from the US. But Defense Secretary Rumsfeld asserts that the Europeans would be unwilling to send more troops. He argues that sending more troops could provoke Afghan resistance and divert US forces from hunting terrorists. National Security Adviser Rice fails to take sides, causing Powell’s proposal to effectively die. In the end, the US only deploys 8,000 troops to Afghanistan in 2002, but all of them are there to hunt down Taliban and al-Qaeda, not to assist with peacekeeping or reconstruction. The 4,000 international peacekeepers do not venture beyond Kabul and the rest of the country remains under the de facto control of local warlords. YORK TIMES, 8/12/2007 Entity Tags: Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, Hamid Karzai, Condoleezza Rice Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Afghanistan February 2002: DIA Suggests Prisoner Probably Lying about Al-Qaeda Ties to Iraq; but His Allegations Will Be Used in Bush Speech Later The Defense Intelligence Agency issues a four-page Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary (DITSUM No. 044-02) stating that it is probable that prisoner Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi intentionally misled debriefers when he claimed Iraq was supporting al-Qaeda in working with illicit weapons. During interviews with al-Libi, the DIA noted the Libyan al-Qaeda operative could not name any Iraqis involved, any chemical or biological material used, or where the alleged training took place. “It is possible he does not know any further details; it is more likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers,” the report says. “Ibn al-Shaykh has been undergoing debriefs for several weeks and may be describing scenarios to the debriefers that he knows will retain their interest.” The DIA report is presumably circulated widely within the government, and is available to the CIA, the White House, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, and other agencies. No Evidence of Connections between Iraq, al-Qaeda - On the general subject of Iraq’s alleged ties to al-Qaeda, the DIA report notes: “Saddam Hussein‘s regime is intensely secular and is wary of Islamic revolutionary movements. Moreover, Baghdad is unlikely to provide assistance to a group it cannot control.” The report also questions the reliability of information provided by high-value al-Qaeda detainees being held in secret CIA facilities or who have been “rendered” to foreign countries where they are believed to undergo harsh interrogation tactics. Using al-Libi's Information to Bolster Case for War - Information supplied by al-Libi will be the basis for a claim included in an October 2002 speech (see October 7, 2002) by President Bush, in which he states, “We’ve learned that Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members in bomb making and poisons and gases.” Intelligence provided by al-Libi will also be included in Colin Powell’s February speech (see February 5, 2003) to the UN. In that speech, Powell will cite “the story of a senior terrorist operative telling how Iraq provided training in these weapons to al-Qaeda.” YORK TIMES, 11/6/2005; WASHINGTON POST, 11/6/2005; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 11/7/2005; NEWSWEEK, 11/10/2005 Report Released as Proof of Administration's Reliance on Poor Intelligence Sources - Declassified portions of the DIA report will be issued on November 6, 2005 by two senators, Carl Levin (D-MI) and John D. Rockefeller (D-WV). Rockefeller will tell CNN that al-Libi is “an entirely unreliable individual upon whom the White House was placing a substantial intelligence trust.” The situation was, Rockefeller will say, “a classic example of a lack of accountability to the American people.” ANGELES TIMES, 11/7/2005 Entity Tags: Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, US Department of Defense, National Security Council, George W. Bush, Saddam Hussein, Colin Powell, Al-Qaeda, Defense Intelligence Agency, Bush administration, John D. Rockefeller, Carl Levin, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links Between February 1, 2002 and February 11, 2002: FBI Whistleblower Reassigned to Windowless Office; Given Permission to Write Description of Allegations at Home FBI contract translator Sibel Edmonds is reassigned to the windowless office of translation-department supervisor Stephanie Bryan. Bryan instructs Edmonds to write a confidential memo explaining her allegations and gives her permission to write it at home. She turns in the memo on February 11. PRESS, 1/14/2005; VANITY FAIR, 9/2005 Entity Tags: Sibel Edmonds, Stephanie Bryan Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds February 1, 2002: FBI Supervisors Cancels Meeting with Whistleblowers Concerned about Security Violations in Translation Center Before their scheduled meeting with FBI supervisor Mike Feghali, translators Sibel Edmonds and Kevin Taskasen meet with FBI field agent Dennis Saccher to discuss how they will present their findings to Feghali on efforts by translator Melek Can Dickerson to protect certain surveillance targets. After the short pre-meeting, they take an elevator and run into Feghali who—unaware that the two translators had just met with Saccher—tells them that Saccher can’t make the meeting because “he’s been sent out somewhere in the field.” Saccher later tells Edmonds that he had been told the meeting was postponed. After the meeting, Saccher’s superiors order him off the case and, in an unprecedented move, prohibit him from obtaining copies of Edmond’s translations, even though he is the one in charge of Turkish counter-intelligence. He chooses not to resist, citing his concern that he might be assigned “to some fucked-up office in the land of tornadoes.” FAIR, 9/2005 In a 2005 interview, Edmonds will assert that the efforts to bury her allegations did not originate in the FBI, but rather “came directly from the Department of State.” According to Edmonds, the State Department was concerned that her findings might jeopardize high-level criminal operations involving certain US allies. (.COM), 8/15/2005 Entity Tags: Melek Can Dickerson, Kevin Taskasen, Sibel Edmonds, Dennis Saccher, US Department of State, Mike Feghali Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds February 5, 2002: Saeed Sheikh Secretly Turns Himself In to His ISI Bosses Sheikh Sheikh photographed while in secret custody in February 2002. CNN Pakistani police, with the help of the FBI, determine Saeed Sheikh is behind the kidnapping of Daniel Pearl, but are unable to find him. They round up about ten of his relatives and threaten to harm them unless he turns himself in. Saeed Sheikh does turn himself in, but to Ijaz Shah, his former ISI boss. GLOBE, 2/7/2002; VANITY FAIR, 8/2002 The ISI holds Saeed for a week, but fails to tell Pakistani police or anyone else that they have him. This “missing week” is the cause of much speculation. The ISI never tells Pakistani police any details about this week. 3/11/2002 Saeed also later refuses to discuss the week or his connection to the ISI, only saying, “I will not discuss this subject. I do not want my family to be killed.” He adds, “I know people in the government and they know me and my work.” 3/13/2002; VANITY FAIR, 8/2002 It is suggested Saeed is held for this week to make sure that Pearl would be killed. Saeed later says that during this week he got a coded message from the kidnappers that Pearl had been murdered. Also, the time might have been spent working out a deal with the ISI over what Saeed would tell police and the public. 3/11/2002 Several others with both extensive ISI and al-Qaeda ties wanted for the kidnapping are arrested around this time. POST, 2/23/2002; LONDON TIMES, 2/25/2002 One of these men, Khalid Khawaja, “has never hidden his links with Osama bin Laden. At one time he used to fly Osama’s personal plane.” NEWS SERVICE (NEWARK, CA), 2/11/2002 Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Khalid Khawaja, Daniel Pearl, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Ijaz Shah, Al-Qaeda, Saeed Sheikh Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh February 6, 2002: CIA’s Tenet Worried over Possible Terrorist Attack on Chemical Facility CIA Director George Tenet tells the Senate Intelligence Committee that one of the agency’s “highest concerns” is a terrorist attack on an American chemical facility (see Late September 2001). 2008, PP. 93 Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Senate Intelligence Committee, Central Intelligence Agency Category Tags: Internal US Security After 9/11 February 6, 2002: CIA Director Tenet Says He Is Proud of CIA’s Handling of 9/11 CIA Director George Tenet tells a Senate hearing that there was no 9/11 intelligence failure. When asked about the CIA record on 9/11, he says, “We are proud of that record.” He also states that the 9/11 plot was “in the heads of three or four people” and thus nearly impossible to prevent. TODAY, 2/7/2002 Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Warning Signs, 9/11 Denials February 6, 2002: New York Times: US Officials Have Confirmed April 2001 Meeting between Atta and Iraqi Agent The New York Times reports, “Senior American intelligence officials have concluded that the meeting between Mr. Atta and the Iraqi officer, Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, did take place. But they say they do not believe that the meeting provides enough evidence to tie Iraq to the Sept. 11 attacks.” A month and a half earlier, the same newspaper had reported that sources in the Czech Republic thought that it had been a different “Mohamed Atta” who had met al-Ani (see December 16, 2001). 11/9/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 12/16/2001 SOURCES: UNNAMED SENIOR US INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links February 6, 2002: US Officials Claim CIA Has Not Linked Hussein to Terrorism, WMDs, or Al-Qaeda for Many Years Unnamed US intelligence officials tell the New York Times that the CIA has no evidence that Saddam Hussein’s government has participated in any militant operations against the United States in nearly a decade. The agency also believes that Saddam Hussein has not provided chemical or biological weapons to al-Qaeda or other militant Islamic organizations. YORK TIMES, 2/6/2002 SOURCES: UNNAMED US INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links February 6, 2002 and After: Western Media Largely Ignores Links between Saeed Sheikh, ISI, and 9/11 Pakistani police publicly name Saeed Sheikh and a Islamic militant group he belongs to, Jaish-e-Mohammed, as those responsible for reporter Daniel Pearl’s murder. 2/24/2002 In the next several months, at least 12 Western news articles mention Saeed’s links to al-Qaeda NEWS, 2/7/2002; BOSTON GLOBE, 2/7/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2/24/2002; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 3/15/2002 , including his financing of 9/11 YORK DAILY NEWS, 2/7/2002; CNN, 2/8/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2/9/2002; GUARDIAN, 2/9/2002; INDEPENDENT, 2/10/2002; TIME, 2/10/2002; NEW YORK POST, 2/10/2002; EVENING STANDARD, 2/12/2002; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 2/13/2002; NEW YORK POST, 2/22/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 2/24/2002; USA TODAY, 3/8/2002 , and at least 16 articles mention his links to the ISI. NEWS SERVICE, 2/21/2002; OBSERVER, 2/24/2002; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 2/24/2002; NEWSWEEK, 2/25/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 2/25/2002; USA TODAY, 2/25/2002; NATIONAL POST, 2/26/2002; BOSTON GLOBE, 2/28/2002; NEWSWEEK, 3/11/2002; NEWSWEEK, 3/13/2002; GUARDIAN, 4/5/2002; MSNBC, 4/5/2002 However, many other articles fail to mention either link. Only a few articles consider that Saeed could have been connected to both groups at the same time TIMES, 2/25/2002; PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 3/3/2002; LONDON TIMES, 4/21/2002 , and apparently, only one of these mentions he could be involved in the ISI, al-Qaeda, and financing 9/11. TIMES, 4/21/2002 By the time Saeed is convicted of Pearl’s murder in July 2002, Saeed’s possible connections to al-Qaeda and/or the ISI are virtually unreported in US newspapers, while many British newspapers are still making one or the other connection. Entity Tags: Daniel Pearl, Al-Qaeda, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Saeed Sheikh, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Media, Saeed Sheikh After February 7, 2002: Bush Authorizes Secret CIA Prison System The Salt Pit, a secret CIA prison near Kabul, Afghanistan. Space Imaging Middle East President George Bush signs a secret order authorizing the CIA to set up a network of secret detention and interrogation centers outside the United States where high value prisoners can be interrogated “with unprecedented harshness.” 5/24/2004 This takes place shortly after February 7, 2002, when Bush declared that al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners were not subject to the Geneva Convention (see February 7, 2002). The first secret CIA prison will begin operating in Thailand in March 2002 (see March 2002). Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics After February 7, 2002: US Makes Agreements with Other Countries to Set Up Secret CIA Prisons The US negotiates “status of force” agreements with several foreign governments allowing the US to set up CIA-run interrogation facilities and granting immunity to US personnel and private contractors. The facilities were authorized by a recent secret presidential directive (see After February 7, 2002). 5/24/2004 The CIA-run centers are kept completely under wraps. Prisoners are secretly held in custody and hidden from International Human rights organizations. In these facilities, there will be several incidents of abuse, torture, and murder. COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 2/24/2004 ; WASHINGTON POST, 5/11/2004; NEW YORK TIMES, 5/13/2004 These secret detentions centers will be operated in several locations around the world including: Afghanistan - Asadabad, Kabul, Jalalabad, Gardez, Khost, Bagram, Kabul (known as “the Pit”). 6/2004 ; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, 6/17/2004 Pakistan - Kohat (near the border of Afghanistan), Alizai. 6/2004 ; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, 6/17/2004 Britain - Diego Garcia (British Possession in the Indian Ocean). 6/2004 ; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, 6/17/2004 Jordan - Al Jafr Prison. 6/2004 ; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, 6/17/2004 United States naval ships at sea - The USS Bataan and the USS Peleliu. 6/2004 ; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, 6/17/2004 Thailand - Inside an unknown US military base, which is the first to become operational in March 2002 (see March 2002). NEWS, 12/5/2005 Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives February 9, 2002: Pakistani Gangster Admits Ties to ISI, Saeed Sheikh, and Terrorism Aftab Ansari in Indian custody shortly after being arrested. Rajeev Bhatt Gangster Aftab Ansari is deported to India. He was arrested in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on February 5. 2/10/2002 He admits funding attacks through kidnapping ransoms, and building a network of arms and drug smuggling. PRESSE-AGENTUR (HAMBURG), 2/11/2002 He later also admits to close ties with the ISI and Saeed Sheikh, whom he befriended in prison. TRUST OF INDIA, 5/13/2002 Entity Tags: Aftab Ansari, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Saeed Sheikh Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh, Key Captures and Deaths February 9, 2002: Pakistani and Afghan Leaders Revive Afghanistan Pipeline Idea Pakistani President Musharraf and Afghan leader Hamid Karzai announce their agreement to “cooperate in all spheres of activity” including the proposed Central Asian pipeline, which they call “in the interest of both countries.” TIMES, 2/9/2002; GULF NEWS, 9/2/2002 Entity Tags: Hamid Karzai, Pervez Musharraf Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Pipeline Politics, Afghanistan February 10, 2002: Driver’s License Examiner Dies in Suspicious Circumstances Katherine Smith is killed one day before her scheduled appearance in court on charges she helped five Islamic men get illegal drivers licenses. According to witnesses, she veered into a utility pole when a fire erupted in her car. She was burned beyond recognition. The FBI later determines that gasoline was poured on her clothing before she died in the fire and find that arson was the cause of death. PRESS, 2/15/2002 A suicide note was found, but prosecutors say they are looking for murder suspects. One of the five men, Sakhera Hammad, was found with a pass in his wallet giving access to the restricted areas of the WTC, dated September 5, 2001. Hammad claims he was a plumber and worked on the WTC’s sprinkler system that day, but the company with exclusive rights to all WTC plumbing work has never heard of him. Smith was being investigated by the FBI; the five later plead guilty to charges of fraud. MEMPHIS, 2/12/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2/13/2002; REUTERS, 2/15/2002; COMMERCIAL APPEAL (MEMPHIS), 2/21/2002 One of the five, Khaled Odtllah, drove from New York City to Memphis on 9/11. Tennessee is one of only four US states that doesn’t require a Social Security card to get a driver’s license. A prosecutor accuses each of the five men of attempting to acquire a “completely false and untraceable identity.” PRESS, 2/12/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2/15/2002 One month later, the coroner who examines her body is targeted by a bomb, which is defused. Then in June the coroner is attacked, bound with barbed wire, and left with a bomb tied to his body, but he survives. APPEAL (MEMPHIS), 3/14/2002 Entity Tags: Katherine Smith, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khaled Odtllah, Sakhera Hammad, World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Other Post-9/11 Events February 12, 2002: ISI Deliver Saeed Sheikh to Pakistani Police Saeed Sheikh, already in ISI custody for a week, is handed over to Pakistani police. Shortly afterwards, he publicly confesses to his involvement in reporter Daniel Pearl’s murder. Later he will recant this confession. It appears that initially he thought he would get a light sentence. Newsweek describes him initially “confident, even cocky,” saying he would only serve three to four years if convicted, and would never be extradited. 3/11/2002 He is sentenced in July 2002 to hang instead. Pakistani militants respond to his arrest with three suicide attacks that kill more than 30 people. 7/16/2002 Entity Tags: Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Daniel Pearl, Saeed Sheikh Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh, Key Captures and Deaths February 12, 2002: Ashcroft Calls for ‘Highest State of Alert’ Attorney General John Ashcroft says “I want to encourage…all Americans everywhere to be on the highest state of alert.” The FBI warns of a threat from Yemeni or Saudi Arabian terrorists who may be planning an imminent attack. 2/12/2002 It is later revealed that the threat hadn’t been corroborated by other US intelligence agencies. In addition, the threat actually indicated a more likely attack in Yemen. This announcement was made the same day that Enron CEO Kenneth Lay appeared before Congress. A week earlier, the White House had been ordered to refrain from destroying any documentation related to Enron. STONE, 9/21/2006 Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, Kenneth Lay, White House, Enron, Federal Bureau of Investigation Category Tags: Terror Alerts, Internal US Security After 9/11 Afternoon February 12, 2002: FBI Translator Submits Formal Memo Alleging Security Breaches by Co-Worker in Department FBI translator Sibel Edmonds submits a confidential memo (see Between February 1, 2002 and February 11, 2002) alleging that co-translator Melek Can Dickerson shielded Turkish officials from an FBI investigation by failing to translate important wiretapped conversations. Edmonds’ supervisor, Stephanie Bryan, passes the memo onto supervisory special agent Tom Frields. But Frields says he will not look at the memo until after Dickerson and supervisor Mike Feghali have reviewed and commented on it. Shortly after submitting the memo, Edmonds is informed that she is being investigated by the bureau’s security department because she wrote the memo on a home computer, even though she had received explicit permission to do so (see Between February 1, 2002 and February 11, 2002). Before leaving the office, Dickerson allegedly comes over to her and says, “Why are you doing this, Sibel? Why don’t you just drop it? You know there could be serious consequences. Why put your family in Turkey in danger over this?” YORK OBSERVER, 1/22/2004; VANITY FAIR, 9/2005 The following day, three FBI agents come to the home of Sibel and Matthew Edmonds and seize their computer. PRESS, 1/14/2005; VANITY FAIR, 9/2005 Entity Tags: Thomas Frields, Stephanie Bryan, Sibel Edmonds, Melek Can Dickerson, Mike Feghali Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds February 13, 2002: Al-Qaeda Stops Using Monitored Communications Hub after Shootout A safe house in Sana’a, Yemen, where Samir al-Hada was hiding. CNN Samir al-Hada, an al-Qaeda operative who helped run a vital al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana’a, Yemen (see Late 1998-Early 2002), dies while being pursued by Yemeni police. The Yemeni police were tipped off by Samir’s landlord that he was planning to flee the country when he failed to produce identity documents to renew his lease. The police stake out his hideout for a week but he escapes and, during the chase, a grenade explodes in his hand and kills him. He was the brother-in-law of 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar. 2/13/2002; GUARDIAN, 2/14/2002; CNN, 2/14/2002; AL AHRAM, 2/21/2002 After the attack, the police search the house where al-Hada had been staying and seize weapons, documents, books, a mobile phone, and a piece of paper containing phone numbers. NEWS, 2/13/2002; BBC, 2/15/2002 The al-Hada hub was used in planning the embassy bombings in 1998 (see August 4-25, 1998 and October 4, 2001), the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 (see October 14-Late November, 2000), and 9/11 (see Early 2000-Summer 2001). It had been monitored by the NSA since the late 1990s (see Late August 1998 and Early 1999). Ahmed al-Hada is in Yemeni custody by 2006; it has not been stated when or how he was captured. 2006, PP. 378 It appears that the communications hub is no longer functional after al-Hada’s death, as there are no more references to it operating, several of the al-Hada clan are rounded up, the hub is again discussed by the media (see February 2001 and After), and the clan’s patriarch, Ahmed al-Hada, is again named in the media. JOURNAL SENTINEL, 2/14/2002; CNN, 2/14/2002; AL AHRAM, 2/21/2002 Entity Tags: Ahmed al-Hada, National Security Agency, Yemen, Al-Qaeda, Samir al-Hada Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Remote Surveillance, Yemen Hub, Key Captures and Deaths, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11 (February 13, 2002): FBI Translations Supervisor Dismisses Allegations by Whistleblower in Memo to Superiors Mike Feghali, the supervisor of the FBI’s translations center, writes in a memo to his superiors that “there was no basis” for Sibel Edmonds’s allegations (see Afternoon February 12, 2002) that FBI translator Melek Can Dickerson had shielded Turkish officials from FBI investigation by failing to provide field agents with accurate transcripts of wiretapped conversations. FAIR, 9/2005 Entity Tags: Sibel Edmonds, Melek Can Dickerson, Mike Feghali Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds February 14, 2002: US Military Bases Line Afghan Pipeline Route The Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv notes: “If one looks at the map of the big American bases created the Afghan war, one is struck by the fact that they are completely identical to the route of the projected oil pipeline to the Indian Ocean.” Ma’ariv also states, “Osama bin Laden did not comprehend that his actions serve American interests… If I were a believer in conspiracy theory, I would think that bin Laden is an American agent. Not being one I can only wonder at the coincidence.” TRIBUNE, 3/18/2002 Entity Tags: United States, Osama bin Laden Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Pipeline Politics, US Dominance, Afghanistan February 14, 2002: US Gives More Aid to Pakistan Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf meets with President Bush in Washington, DC. Bush lavishly praises Musharraf, saying: “President Musharraf is a leader with great courage and vision.… I am proud to call him my friend.” Since 9/11, Pakistan has received $600 million in emergency aid, $500 million for supporting US forces, a moratorium on paying back its debt to the US, and the US has canceled economic sanctions against it. Bush announces the US will now cancel $1 billion of Pakistan’s US debt, reschedule the remaining $1.8 billion, and give $100 million for education reform. 2008, PP. 148-149 The month before, Musharraf denounced terrorism in a public speech (see January 12, 2002). But by the start of February, it is already clear that the militant groups Musharraf banned just after the speech have resumed operations under new names with the encouragement of the Pakistani ISI. 2008, PP. 147 Furthermore, CIA communications intercepts indicate the Pakistani army deliberately left portions of the border with Afghanistan unguarded, allowing Osama bin Laden and thousands of other al-Qaeda operatives to flee into Pakistan (see December 10, 2001). The Pakistani army still has not moved into the regions where al-Qaeda is regrouping (see Late May 2002), and will not allow US troops to enter these regions either (see Early 2002 and After). Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, George W. Bush Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics February 15, 2002: Saudi Who Knew 9/11 Hijacker Hanjour Convicted of Lying to FBI Faisal al-Salmi, a Saudi man who knew 9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour, is convicted of making false statements to the FBI. Al-Salmi, 34, trained at the same Arizona flight school as Hanjour where they both used the flight simulator (see Summer 2001). Al-Salmi denied knowing Hanjour but, according to investigators, they spoke several times and were seen together in the summer of 2001. He is not accused of being involved in the 9/11 plot. Al-Salmi will later receive a six-month sentence. PRESS, 10/13/2001; TIME, 10/28/2001; ARIZONA DAILY WILDCAT, 2/14/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 2/16/2002; CNN, 4/20/2002; ARIZONA DAILY STAR, 7/24/2004 Entity Tags: Faisal al-Salmi, Hani Hanjour, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Hani Hanjour, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11 February 16, 2002: Bush Directs CIA to Conduct Operations in Iraq Bush signs an intelligence finding directing the CIA to conduct some of the operations that have been proposed in the Anabasis plan devised by veteran CIA agents Luis (full-name not disclosed) and John Maguire (see Late November 2001 or December 2001). The plan called for conducting covert operations within Iraq as part of a larger effort to overthrow Hussein’s government. POST, 4/17/2004; ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 9 SOURCES: TOP OFFICIALS INTERVIEWED BY WASHINGTON POST EDITOR BOB WOODWARD Entity Tags: Anabasis, George W. Bush Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism February 18, 2002: Pakistan Applies Censorship on Link Between ISI and Saeed Sheikh The Pakistani government unsuccessfully tries to stop Pakistani newspaper The News from publishing a story revealing Saeed Sheikh’s connections to the ISI, based on leaks from Pakistani police interrogations. POST, 3/10/2002; LONDON TIMES, 4/21/2002; GUARDIAN, 7/16/2002 According to the article, Saeed admits his involvement in recent attacks on the Indian parliament in Delhi and in Kashmir, and says the ISI helped him finance, plan, and execute them. (ISLAMABAD), 2/18/2002 On March 1, the ISI pressures The News to fire the four journalists who worked on the story. The ISI also demands an apology from the newspaper’s editor, who flees the country instead. POST, 3/10/2002; LONDON TIMES, 4/21/2002; GUARDIAN, 7/16/2002 Entity Tags: Saeed Sheikh, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh February 19, 2002: Gen. Franks: US Is Deploying Resources from Afghanistan to Iraq General Tommy Franks allegedly tells Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL), who is on a visit to US Central Command: “Senator, we have stopped fighting the war on terror in Afghanistan. We are moving military and intelligence personnel and resources out of Afghanistan to get ready for a future war in Iraq.” ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 3/26/2004 (In his memoirs, Graham quotes Franks as saying that “military and intelligence personnel are being re-deployed to prepare for an action in Iraq.”) AND NUSSBAUM, 2004, PP. 125; KNIGHT RIDDER, 6/18/2005 Franks will deny making the comment. RIDDER, 6/18/2005 The New Yorker magazine will also report on a redeployment of resources to Iraq at this time (see Early March 2002). YORKER, 10/27/2003 In 2009, Graham will tell a Vanity Fair reporter: “In February of ‘02, I had a visit at Central Command, in Tampa, and the purpose was to get a briefing on the status of the war in Afghanistan. At the end of the briefing, the commanding officer, Tommy Franks, asked me to go into his office for a private meeting, and he told me that we were no longer fighting a war in Afghanistan and, among other things, that some of the key personnel, particularly some Special Operations units and some equipment, specifically the Predator unmanned drone, were being withdrawn in order to get ready for a war in Iraq. That was my first indication that war in Iraq was as serious a possibility as it was, and that it was in competition with Afghanistan for materiel. We didn’t have the resources to do both successfully and simultaneously.” FAIR, 2/2009 Entity Tags: Thomas Franks, Bob Graham Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism, Afghanistan February 19, 2002: Alleged Cyanide Bomb Plot against US Embassy Uncovered in Rome Tunnels under the US embassy in Rome. BBC Four Moroccans are arrested in Rome in possession of several pounds of a cyanide compound. In addition, police find a map marked with the location of a water main in central Rome. When news of the arrest is leaked to the Italian media on the following day, there are widespread fears of a plot to poison Rome’s water supply. The press speculates that the men may be linked to al-Qaeda. The US embassy in Rome may also have been a target, says an embassy spokesman. In the following days, five more men, also from Morocco, are arrested. However, within days the cyanide compound is identified as potassium ferro-cyanide, which has many agricultural and industrial uses. An official says it could not have been used to poison the water supply. Following the initial arrest, Italian authorities inspect public utility tunnels in central Rome and find a hole in one of them near the US embassy. Police say that they suspect the plotters had planned a bomb attack against the embassy. The potassium ferro-cyanide, although harmless in itself, may have been used to produce a toxic gas if heated, investigators say. According to a police expert, “A toxic cloud would have formed and spread through the tunnels under the center of Rome.” The nine suspects are held without bail pending trial, but will be later acquitted (see April 28, 2004). NEWS, 2/20/2002; BBC NEWS, 2/21/2002; BBC NEWS, 2/24/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 2/25/2002; TIME, 2/25/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 2/26/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 2/27/2002 Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Italy, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Terror Alerts February 20, 2002: Pentagon Office Designed for Telling Lies Revealed; Declared Closed The Pentagon announces the existence of the new Office of Strategic Influence (OSI), which “was quietly set up after September 11.” The role of this office is to plant false stories in the foreign press, phony e-mails from disguised addresses, and other covert activities to manipulate public opinion. The new office proves so controversial that it is declared closed six days later. 2/20/2002; CNN, 2/26/2002 It is later reported that the “temporary” Office of Global Communications will be made permanent (it is unknown when this office began its work). This office seems to serve the same function as the earlier OSI, minus the covert manipulation. POST, 7/30/2002 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld later states that after the OSI was closed, “I went down that next day and said fine, if you want to savage this thing fine I’ll give you the corpse. There’s the name. You can have the name, but I’m gonna keep doing every single thing that needs to be done and I have.” DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 11/18/2002 Entity Tags: Pentagon, US Department of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, Office of Strategic Influence, Office of Global Communications Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties, Domestic Propaganda Category Tags: Media, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics February 22, 2002: Rogue Elements of ISI, Especially Those with CIA Ties, May Be Out of Control In the wake of the kidnapping of Daniel Pearl and suspected ISI ties to the kidnapping plot, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is said to begin a “quiet and massive overhaul” of the ISI. However, one senior military source who once served in the ISI warns, “The biggest problem we have here are the rogue elements in the intelligence agencies, especially those who at some time became involved with the CIA.” The ISI is so used to operating independently that even honest agents may be difficult to control. Many may willfully disobey orders. “Among the more dangerous, sources say, are those who acted as Pakistan’s official liaison between the Pakistan Army and militant groups, such as the Kashmiri-oriented Harkat ul-Mujahedeen and Lashkar-e-Toiba, both of which are on the United States’ list of terrorist organizations. The ISI was also a crucial link between Pakistan and the Taliban in Afghanistan.” SCIENCE MONITOR, 2/22/2002 By early 2003, the Financial Times will note that Musharraf’s attempts at reforms have largely been abandoned. An expert on the region comments, “It is no longer a question of whether Pakistan is going backwards or forwards. It’s a question of how rapidly it’s going backwards.” TIMES, 2/8/2003 Entity Tags: Taliban, Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Central Intelligence Agency, Daniel Pearl, Harkat ul-Mujahedeen Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI February 22, 2002: FBI Supervisor Encourages Whistleblower to Drop Allegations Sibel Edmonds takes her complaints and allegations to supervisory special agent Tom Frields, who encourages her to let the matter rest. When she indicates that she will do no such thing, Frields warns her that if she has disclosed any classified information to anyone she could be arrested. FAIR, 9/2005 Entity Tags: Sibel Edmonds, Thomas Frields Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds February 25, 2002: Taliban Defector Aware of ISI-Al-Qaeda Links Is Ignored by CIA Mullah Mohammed Khaksar. Agence France-Presse Time magazine reports the CIA is still not interested in talking to Mullah Mohammed Khaksar, easily the highest ranking Taliban defector. Khaksar was the Taliban’s deputy interior minister, which put him in charge of vital security matters. He was secretly giving the Northern Alliance intelligence on the Taliban since 1997, and he had sporadic and mostly unsuccessful efforts trying to give information to the US while he still worked for the Taliban (see April 1999 and Between September 12 and Late November 2001). In late November 2001, he defected to the Northern Alliance and was given an amnesty due to his secret collaboration with them. He continues to live in his house in Kabul after the defeat of the Taliban, but is unable to get in contact with US intelligence. In February 2002, Time magazine informs US officials that Khaksar wants to talk, but two weeks later the magazine will report that he still has not been properly interviewed. 2/25/2002 The US may be reluctant to speak to him because much of what he has to say seems to be about al-Qaeda’s links with the Pakistani ISI, and the US is now closely working with Pakistan. Time magazine reports, “The little that Khaksar has divulged to an American general and his intelligence aide—is tantalizing.… He says that the ISI agents are still mixed up with the Taliban and al-Qaeda,” and that the three groups have formed a new political group to get the US out of Afghanistan. He also says that “the ISI recently assassinated an Afghan in the Paktika province who knew the full extent of ISI’s collaboration with al-Qaeda.” 2/19/2002 He will similarly comment to journalist Kathy Gannon that bin Laden’s foreign fighters in Afghanistan “were all protected by the Taliban leadership, but their money and instructions came direction from Pakistan’s ISI.” 2005, PP. 161 Khaksar will continue to live in Afghanistan until early 2006, when he is apparently assassinated by the Taliban. POST, 1/15/2006 Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Central Intelligence Agency, Mullah Omar, Mullah Mohammed Khaksar, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Taliban Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Afghanistan Late February 2002: US Allegedly Helps Arms Dealer Victor Bout Escape Arrest In February 2002, the Belgian government secretly indicts Victor Bout, the world’s biggest illegal arms dealer, on charges of money laundering and illegal weapons trafficking. For the first time, he can be legally arrested and Interpol issues a secret arrest warrant for him anywhere in the world. Later that month, solid intelligence indicates Bout is going to be on a flight from Moldova to Greece. An encrypted message is sent by British intelligence field agents once the plane takes off, alerting their superiors in London that they are preparing to arrest Bout in Athens. But shortly after the message is sent, Bout’s plane veers away from its flight plan and disappears off radar screens into mountainous terrain. It reappears on radar about ninety minutes later and lands in Athens. British special forces raid the plane, but find it empty except for the pilot and a few passengers. One European intelligence official familiar with the operation will later say, “There were only two intelligence services that could have decrypted the British transmission in so short a time. The Russians and the Americans. And we know for sure it was not the Russians.” AND BRAUN, 2007, PP. 202-203 It has been alleged that the US began secretly working with Bout shortly after 9/11, despite his previous connections to the Taliban (see Shortly After September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Victor Bout Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Victor Bout February 28, 2002: Some Republican Politicians Suggest Any Criticism of Bush’s ‘War on Terrorism’ Is Out of Line When asked in a press conference if the success of the “war on terrorism” has been overstated, Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) replies: “I don’t think the success has been overstated. But the continued success I think is still somewhat in doubt.… I will say that at this point, given the information we’ve been provided, I don’t think it would do anybody any good to second-guess what has been done to date. I think it has been successful. I’ve said that on many, many occasions. But I think the jury’s still out about future success, as I’ve said.” He adds that it would be necessary for the US to find Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders for the “war on terrorism” to be considered a success. But despite the mild tone of these comments, Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) responds by saying: “How dare Senator Daschle criticize President Bush while we are fighting our war on terrorism, especially when we have troops in the field. He should not be trying to divide our country while we are united.” Senator Bill Frist (R-TN) calls Daschle’s remarks “thoughtless and ill-timed.” And Representative Tom Davis (R-VA) uses language analogous to a charge of treason, saying that that Daschle’s “divisive comments have the effect of giving aid and comfort to our enemies by allowing them to exploit divisions in our country.” 3/1/2002 Secretary of State Colin Powell defends Daschle and other Democrats, saying: “They’re raising questions. And I think that’s what a loyal opposition does.” The Washington Post editorial board criticizes the Republican response, saying that the US “would be a weaker country if Sen. Lott succeeds in choking off debate.” But Lott refuses to apologize, and says that “any sign that we are losing that unity, or crack in that support, will be, I think, used against us overseas.” YORK TIMES, 3/1/2002; SALON, 3/5/2002 Entity Tags: Trent Lott, Tom Daschle, Colin Powell, Bill Frist, Tom Davis Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics February 28, 2002: Majority of Muslims Believe Arabs Not Responsible for 9/11 A Gallup poll conducted in Muslim nations shows 18 percent believe that Arabs were responsible for 9/11 and 61 percent do not. In Pakistan, 86 percent say Arabs were not responsible. 2/28/2002 Even Pakistani President Musharraf has said bin Laden was not the mastermind, though he says that he probably supported it. 8/4/2002 Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Pervez Musharraf Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: US Government and 9/11 Criticism Spring 2002: US Green Berets Denied Chance to Get Al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan Informants spot Ayman al-Zawahiri in a medical clinic in Gardez, Afghanistan. Green Berets are located just five minutes away, but they are ordered to stand down so SEAL Team Six, can raid the clinic and capture or kill al-Zawahiri. But the SEAL team is apparently located much farther away and too much time elapses while they are preparing for the raid, allowing al-Zawahiri to escape. In 2004, the Washington Post will mention this as one of a series of incidents in which Green Berets units were passed over and opportunities to get important wanted men were lost. POST, 1/5/2004 Entity Tags: Green Berets, Ayman al-Zawahiri, SEAL Team Six Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Other Possible Moles or Informants, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Afghanistan Spring 2002: CIA Taking for Granted US Will Invade Iraq; Tenet Is Warned Invasion Will ‘Break the Back’ of Counterterrorism Efforts CIA official Michael Scheuer will later say, “Clearly, by 2002 in the springtime, it was almost taken for granted that we were going to go to war with Iraq, in addition to having missed Osama bin Laden. It was a nightmare, and I know Director Tenet was briefed repeatedly by the head of the bin Laden department that any invasion of Iraq would break the back of our counterterrorism program.” FRONTLINE, 6/20/2006 Scheuer was head of the CIA’s bin Laden unit in the late 1990s and also leads a review of CIA intelligence on possible Iraq-al-Qaeda ties before the 2003 Iraq war (see (Before March 18, 2003)). Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet, Michael Scheuer Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism Spring 2002: CIA Realizes Bush Administration Is Planning to Invade Iraq CIA official Michael Scheuer will later comment: “By the spring of 2002 the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC) realized that the administration had decided to go to war with Iraq. There was no announcement to that effect, of course, but the intent was evident as the flow of officers sent to beef up the post-9/11 war against al-Qaeda ended and experienced Arabic-speaking officers were reassigned from CTC to Middle East posts (see Spring 2002) and to the task forces at CIA headquarters charged with preparing for the Iraq war.” 2008, PP. 122 He will also say: “It was almost taken for granted that we were going to go to war with Iraq. It was a nightmare, and I know Director George Tenet was briefed repeatedly by the head of the bin Laden department that any invasion of Iraq would break the back of our counterterrorism program.” FRONTLINE, 3/24/2008 Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency, Michael Scheuer, Counterterrorist Center Category Tags: Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism Spring 2002: Focus Shifts from Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda to Iraq The Bush administration shifts its attention from Afghanistan and al-Qaeda to Iraq. White House counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke later recalls: “They took one thing that people on the outside find hard to believe or appreciate. Management time. We’re a huge government, and we have hundreds of thousands of people involved in national security. Therefore you would think we could walk and chew gum at the same time. I’ve never found that to be true.… It just is not credible that the principals and the deputies paid as much attention to Afghanistan or the war against al-Qaeda as they should have.” MONTHLY, 10/2004 Laurence Pope, an ambassador to Chad, will similarly recall that the change in focus that spring had a particularly damaging effect on operations in Afghanistan. “There was a moment of six months or so when we could have put much more pressure on the tribal areas get al-Qaeda, and on Pakistan, and done a better job of reconstruction in Afghanistan. In reality, the Beltway can only do one thing at a time, and because of the attention to Iraq, what should have happened in Afghanistan didn’t.” MONTHLY, 10/2004 US Intelligence agencies are also affected by the shift in priorities. The CIA’s limited supply of Arabic-speakers and Middle East specialists are redeployed to help meet the increasing demand for intelligence on Iraq. Michael Scheuer, a career CIA officer who was working on capturing bin Laden in Afghanistan at the time, says, “With a finite number of people who have any kind of pertinent experience there was unquestionably a sucking away of resources from Afghanistan and al-Qaeda to Iraq, just because it was a much bigger effort.” MONTHLY, 10/2004 Scheuer adds: “There really wasn’t any balance between the two threats, but clearly by 2002 in the springtime, it was almost taken for granted that we were going to go to war with Iraq… It was a nightmare. I know Tenet was briefed repeatedly by the head of the bin Laden department, that any invasion of Iraq would break the back of our counterterrorism program, and it was just ignored.” FRONTLINE, 6/20/2006 In addition to a shift in focus, there is a considerable shift of specialized equipment and personnel (see Early 2002). Entity Tags: Michael Scheuer, Alec Station, Richard A. Clarke, Bush administration, Laurence Pope Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Afghanistan, Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism Spring 2002: CIA Afghanistan Intelligence Gathering Plan Flounders for Lack of Funding The CIA develops an innovative plan to gain intelligence about al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The CIA would spend $80 million to create a new Afghan intelligence service in the new Afghan government. It would be staffed by Afghans but in reality would be “a wholly owned subsidiary of the CIA” with the orders being given by CIA officers. It would be much easier for Afghan operatives to slip into Pakistan and gain information about al-Qaeda operations than it would be for Americans to do so. But the plan is disrupted by the Bush administration’s focus on Iraq. Funding for the new service is repeatedly delayed and key personnel are redeployed to Iraq. 2006, PP. 169-170 Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency Category Tags: Afghanistan, Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism Spring 2002: Much of Al-Qaeda’s Management Council Detained in Iran, Held as Bargaining Chips with US Saad bin Laden. NBC In the spring on 2002, as the Taliban is collapsing in Afghanistan, many al-Qaeda operatives flee into neighboring Iran. About 20 to 25 operatives composing much of al-Qaeda’s management council are said to wind up in the custody of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. Prior to this point, the Iranian government has been turning over most al-Qaeda captives to other countries, but after President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech criticizing Iran (see January 29, 2002), Iran decides to keep this group. POST, 7/9/2004 Iran does not officially admit to holding them, and their status is unclear, but they all seem to be living in a village near the Caspian Sea. One senior US intelligence official says, “They are under virtual house arrest,” and not able to do much. Those said to be in Iranian custody include: Saif al-Adel, one of al-Qaeda’s top military commanders. Suliman abu Ghaith, al-Qaeda spokesman. Saad and Hamza bin Laden, two of Osama bin Laden’s young sons. Abu Dahak, who served as al-Qaeda’s liaison to the rebels in Chechnya. Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, a financial expert. Two unnamed top aides to Ayman al-Zawahiri. 6/24/205 Thirwat Salah Shehata, a member of Islamic Jihad’s ruling council, who is probably one of the al-Zawahiri aides mentioned above. 5/2005 Mustafa Hamza, head of Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, an Egyptian militant group, and an al-Qaeda leader as well (see June 26, 1995). In late 2004, he will be extradited from Iran to stand trial in Egypt. 1/9/2005 At first, these operatives appear to be capable of communicating with operatives outside of Iran. Saad bin Laden is said to play a major role planning the attack of a synagogue in Tunisia in April 2002 (see April 11, 2002). But the Saudi government will suspect that some of the operatives in Iran are involved in a 2003 attack in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (see May 12, 2003), and they will successfully press Iran to tighten the house arrest of the operatives in Iran. Iran will propose an exchange of these prisoners around the time of the Riyadh bombing, but the US will reject the offer (see Mid-May 2003). Since that time, these leaders apparently remain in a state of limbo. CIA Director Porter Goss will say in 2005, “I think the understanding that there is a group of leadership of al-Qaeda under some type of detention—I don’t know exactly what type, necessarily—in Iran is probably accurate.” 6/24/205 Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA’s bin Laden unit, will later ask, “The question is, what does house arrest mean in the Iranian context?” He suggests that Iran could release the group or loosen their restrictions depending on how relations evolve between the US and Iran. “They’re a guarantee against bad behavior.” POST, 9/9/2007 In 2006, it will be reported that Saad bin Laden has been freed. 8/2/2006 Also in 2006, al-Yazid will emerge as a leader of al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan and may never have been in Iran. POST, 9/9/2007 In 2007, the still teenaged Hamza bin Laden will reportedly appear in Afghanistan. PRESS, 9/11/2007 In 2008, it will be reported that the US still knows little about the al-Qaeda figures detained in Iran, but US officials say they believe Iran has largely kept them under control since 2003, limiting their ability to travel and communicate. One US official will say, “It’s been a status quo that leaves these people, some of whom are quite important, essentially on ice.” NEWS, 5/29/2008 Entity Tags: Thirwat Salah Shehata, Saad bin Laden, Saif al-Adel, Mustafa Hamza, Porter J. Goss, Hamza bin Laden, Michael Scheuer, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, Suliman abu Ghaith, Abu Dahak Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran Category Tags: Key Captures and Deaths, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11 Spring 2002: CIA Reduces Operations and Personnel in Afghanistan In mid-March 2002, Deputy CIA Director John E. McLaughlin informs senior members of the president’s national security team that the CIA is cutting back operations in Afghanistan. Presumably the CIA there are to be used in Iraq instead. POST, 10/22/2004 Newsweek will later report that around this time, “The most knowledgeable CIA case officers, the ones with tribal contacts, were rotated out.” The CIA station chief in Kabul, Afghanistan, a fluent Arabic speaker and intellectual, is replaced by a highly unpopular chief who admits to only having read one book on Afghanistan. 8/28/2007 More CIA personnel will move from Afghanistan to Iraq in late 2002 and early 2003 (see Late 2002-Early 2003). Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, John E. McLaughlin Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Afghanistan, Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism March Category:Timeline